

사회과학연구지원(SSK)

동아시아지역질서 연구회-북경대 라운드 테이블

## **The New Regional Order in Northeast Asia**

일시: 2014.1.2-5

장소: 북경대학교

주최: 서울대학교 (동아시아지역질서 연구회)

북경대학교

이화여자대학교

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## I. Introduction

- 2012-2015 사회과학연구지원(SSK))에 따라 '동아시아지역질서 연구회(연구책임자 전재성)'팀과 북경대학교 국제관계학과 교수 및 대학원생들 간의 국제 세미나
  - 회의 진행 (영어)
    - 첫 날 제 1 회의는 라운드 테이블 형식으로 양측의 교수 급 참석자들의 연구 주제 발표 및 토론
    - 첫 날 제 2 회의는 한국/중국 양측의 대학원생들간의 주제 발표(한국) 및 토론(한국, 중국)
    - 둘째 날 회의는 한국/중국 양측 연구자들간의 동아시아 국제질서와 현안에 대한 발표 및 토론. SSK 참여 대학원생들은 토론자로 참여.
- ※ 발제자는 약10-15분 이내로 발제, 사회자가 각 세션을 주재.

## II. Announcement

### 1. 항공일정 및 공항-호텔 이동

#### ■ 기본 항공일정

- 출국: 2014. 1. 2(목) 08:40 김포 출발(SKYCITY INTL TERMINSL) [OZ3315]

2014. 1. 2(목) 09:45 북경 도착(TERMINAL 3)

- 귀국: 2014. 1. 5(일) 15:30 북경 출발(TERMINAL 3) [OZ334]

2014. 1. 5(일) 16:25 인천 도착

#### ■ 인천공항 입/출국 시, 참가자 개별수속 및 탑승

■ 북경 도착 시, 입국수속 완료 후 공항 로비에 집결.

● 유 흠(현지 코디네이터 및 통역) 군이 공항에 마중 나올 예정입니다.

### 2. 회의장소 및 숙소

#### ■ 회의장

C105, School of International Studies, Peking University

#### ■ 3 일 오찬/만찬 장소

Shaoyuan Guest House, Langrun, Weixiu (勺园七号楼 : 朗润 , 蔚秀)

#### ■ 4 일 만찬 장소

미정

- 숙소: The Peninsula Beijing

(주소) 8 Goldfish Lane, Wangfujing

(전화) (+86-10).8516.2888

(웹사이트) <http://www.peninsula.com/Beijing/en/default.aspx>

### 3. 경비 지원

- SSK 팀 참여자에 한해 항공료 및 공식일정기간 숙박비(01.02 체크인/01.05 체크아웃) 및 식비 지원

- 발표 및 토론 사례비: 중국 측 참여자(교수 급)에게 개인 계좌로 입금

\*참가자 본인 부담: 호텔 전화비, 미니바, 세탁비, 추가 체제비 등 (체크아웃 시 개별 지불)

### 4. 비상 연락망

- SSK 팀

- 유 흠 (현지 코디네이터 및 통역) 183.1017.5794(현지전화)
- 도종윤 (서울대 국제문제연구소) 010.7151.1648(로밍)

- 항공권 발권여행사

- 삼화여행사 이미숙 실장 02.3789.7800/010.8739.9801

- 주 중국 한국대사관

(전화) +86. 139.1101.9526

## 5. 기타

- 이동 수단: 세미나 참가일인 3 일과 4 일은 20 인승 미니버스로 이동. 나머지 일정(공항 이동)은 현지 대중 교통 수단 이용.

### III. Programme

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## **The New Regional Order in Northeast Asia**

### **(Korea-China Round Table)**

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**C105, School of International Studies, Peking University**

#### **<First Meeting>**

<b>Time</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Topics and Participants</b>
<b>03. Jan. (Friday)</b>		
09:00-09:30	<b>Registration and Opening Remarks</b>	tba
09:30-12:00	Session 1	<p><b>Theorizing Northeast Asian Politics (Round Table)</b></p> <hr/> <p>• Moderator Prof. CHUN Chae-sung (Director, Center for International Studies, Seoul Nat'l Univ)</p> <p>• Speakers</p> <p>Prof. SHIN, Wook-hee (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>Prof. MIN, Byoung-won (Ewha Womans Univ.)</p> <p>Prof. SHIN, Beom-shik (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>Dr. DOH, Jong-yoon (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p>

		<p>Prof. ZHU, Feng (Peking University)</p> <p>Prof. YU Tiejun (Peking University)</p> <p>Prof. GUI Yongtao (Peking University)</p> <p>Prof. WANG Dong (Peking University)</p>
12:00-14:00	<b>Luncheon</b>	
14:00-18:00	<b>Session 2</b>	<p><b>Past, Present and Future in Northeast Asia</b> <b>(Graduate Discussion)</b></p> <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderator Prof. YU Tiejun (Peking University)</li> <li>• Speakers <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. “A Study on the Period of Power Shift: Sino-Japanese Relations, 2004-2010”  LEE, Bo-mi (Seoul Nat’l Univ.)</li> <li>2. “Status and development Process of Chinese IR theory since 1990s”  KIM, Ji-young (Ewha Womans Univ.)</li> <li>3. “Asia-Pacific as a Region: From Institution-building of APEC to Region-Building”  LEE, Jae-hyun (Seoul Nat’l Univ.)</li> </ol> </li> <li>• Discussants  MARTYN Ari (Peking University)  DENG Haoyu(Peking University)  WANG Jie(Peking University)  CRAIG(Peking University)</li> </ul>



		<p>CHUNG Young-june (Peking University)</p> <p>HAN Yong Jon(Peking University)</p> <p>CHEN Ran (Peking University)</p> <p>YONG, Chae-young (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>OK, Chang-joon (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>JEUNG, Ha-yeun (Ewha Womans Univ.)</p> <p>SUK, Ju- hee (Ewha Womans Univ.)</p> <p>CHOI, Jae-in(Ewha Womans Univ.)</p>
18:30-	<b>Dinner</b>	

## <Second Meeting>

### C105, School of International Studies, Peking University

Time	Section	Topics and Participants
04. Jan. (Saturday)		
14::00-17:30	Session	<p><b>Current Issues in Northeast Asian Politics</b></p> <hr/> <p>• Moderator</p> <p>Prof. SHIN, Beom-shik (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>• Speakers</p> <p>Prof. SHIN, Wook-hee (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>Prof. MIN, Byoung-won (Ewha Womans Univ.)</p> <p>Prof. CHUN Chae-sung (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p>

		<p>Dr. DOH, Jong-yoon (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>Prof. ZHU, Feng (Peking University)</p> <p>Prof. YU Tiejun (Peking University)</p> <p>Prof. GUI Yongtao (Peking University)</p> <p>Prof. WANG Dong (Peking University)</p> <p>• Discussants</p> <p>YONG, Chae-young (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>OK, Chang-joon (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>LEE, Bo-mi (Seoul Nat'l Univ.)</p> <p>KIM, Ji-young (Ewha Womans Univ.)</p>
18:00–	<b>Dinner</b>	

## IV. Participants List

### Korean Participants

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	AFFILIATION		STATUS
CHUN	Chae-sung	Seoul National University		Professor
SHIN	Wook-hee	Seoul National University		Professor
MIN	Byoung-won	Ewha Womans University		Professor
SHIN	Beom-shik	Seoul National University		Professor
DOH	Jong-yoon	Seoul National University		Research Fellow
LEE	Bo-mi	Seoul National University		Graduate Student
KIM	Ji-young	Ewha Womans University		Graduate Student
LEE	Jae-hyun	Seoul National University		Graduate Student
YONG	Chae-young	Seoul National University		Graduate Student
OK	Chang-joon	Seoul National University		Graduate Student
JEUNG	Ha-yeun	Ewha Womans University		Graduate Student
SUK	Ju- hee	Ewha Womans University		Graduate Student

		University	
CHOI	Jae-in	Ewha Womans University	Graduate Student

### Chinese Participants

SURNAM E	GIVEN NAME	AFFILIATION	STATUS
ZHU	Feng	Peking University	Professor
YU	Tiejun	Peking University	Professor
WANG	Dong	Peking University	Professor
GUI	Yongtao	Peking University	Professor
MART YN	Ari	Peking University	Graduate Student
DENG	Haoyu	Peking University	Graduate Student
WANG	Jie	Peking University	Graduate Student
CRAIG	–	Peking University	Graduate Student
CHUN G	Young- june	Peking University	Graduate Student
HAN	Yong Jon	Peking University	Graduate Student
CHEN	Ran	Peking University	Graduate Student

## V. Presentation Materials

## **Theorizing East Asian International Relations**

Chaesung Chun(Seoul National University)

### **I. Questioning the origin of East Asian International affairs**

- Aggravating blame games among East Asians
- Changing and flaring nationalism
- Competing visions for future regional architecture
- Foundering ground for East Asian collective identity, and lack of normative philosophy for peace and common prosperity

### **II. Correcting visions for future East Asia**

- Healing one-hundred years' humiliation for all East Asians
- Normalizing the status of nation and state
- Re-building East Asian regional *polis* and East Asians(not nation/state-building)
- Reunifying East Asia, not just individual state

### **III. Different Conflicts with different origins**

1. Sovereignty issues; territorial disputes, unification(Korea, China), normalization(Japan)

2. History issues; interpreting past history, memory politics, nationalism
3. Balance of power issues; alliance politics, security dilemma and arms building, great power politics
4. Network governance issues; building multi-layered governance of East Asia, regional civil society
5. Pre/post-modern vision politics; recovering empire?

#### **IV. Different cooperations with different origins**

1. Economic interdependence
2. Collective identity with common historical legacy
3. BoP politics with security interests
4. Human security cooperation

#### **V. Complexity of East Asian conflicts and cooperations limiting Western Theories' applicability**

1. Real Asia paradox; complex nexus between security and non-security domain
2. State-oriented markets of East Asian countries, and different logics of economic interdependence
3. Different concepts of democracy and human rights, different types of democracy leading to democratic conflict
4. Multi-layered identity politics, both for competition and cooperation
5. Incomplete modern transition and games among divided and not-normal "billiard balls"



## **VI. Meta-theoretical corrections**

1. ontology; post-Western turn
2. epistemology; post-positivist turn
3. axiology; normative turn
4. methodology; historical sociological turn

## **VII. theory of complex organizing principles**

1. Not one but multiple organizing principles; overcoming *anarchophilia*
2. 1) traditional; 2) modern-transitional; 3) modern; 4) post-modern transitional
3. Hierarchy to anarchy continuum; formal direct empire – formal indirect empire - informal empire – hegemony/primacy – hierarchy – anarchy
4. Heterarchy; Hierarchy in anarchy, hierarchy with anarchy

## **VIII. Normative and Practical visions**

- Attributing blames partly to structural principles, not wholly to agents
- Enhancing regional philosophy, mitigating nationalism
- Decoupling the inside from outside, containing domestic politics from East Asian affairs

### Periodization of Northeast Regional Order and Korean foreign relations

	period	Constitutional features	Units	Main Actors	Korea's main goals	Major ideologies
<b>Traditional order I</b>	- 1400	Anarchy under hierarchy	Territorial Dynasty	Emperor, King, aristocrats	Survival, autonomy, regional hegemony	Hegemonism, dynastic rivalry and balance of power
<b>Traditional order II</b>	1400-1876	Neo-Confucian societal order	Territorial Dynasty	Emperor, King, aristocrats	Survival, development, regionalization	Hegemonism, regional harmony
<b>Modern Transition</b>	1876-1945	Imperial order	Empires and Colonies	States, capitalists	Survival, state-building	Imperialism, balance of power
<b>Modern order</b>	1945-1991	Hierarchy with Anarchy	Nation-states, incomplete	States	Survival, state-building, ideological victory	Ideological bipolarity, balance of power
<b>Post-modern transition</b>	1991-	Neo-Heterarchy	Nation-states and others	States, societal actors, IOs	Unification, development as a middle power	Uni-muti polarity, balance of power, regionalism

## **Beauty of Simplicity?: Sovereignty and Regional Stability in Northeast Asia**

Wookhee Shin (Seoul National University)

SNU/PKU workshop on 'Complexity and East Asian Regional Order' (2014/1/3, Beijing)

Order = stability + @

Normative theory/critical theory

H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: The Study of Order in World Politics*

A. Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Value, and the Constitution of International Society*

Order without stability is impossible.

Explanatory theory/problem-solving theory

Regional instability in East Asia after the Cold War or in the early 21<sup>st</sup> Century

Main causes of instability?

Levels of analysis cf) paradigm debates

K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*

1<sup>st</sup> image – leader (Xi, Abe, Park, Kim + Obama)

2<sup>nd</sup> image – state (democratic peace)

3<sup>rd</sup> image – system (power transition, rising China, China threat)

How to obtain stability?

3<sup>rd</sup> image theories:

Balance or power/balance of threat – balancing against rising China/China threat

Neo-liberal institutionalism – structural modifiers such as economic interdependence and multilateralism

2<sup>nd</sup> image theories: democratization, human rights

1<sup>st</sup> image theories: ??

3<sup>rd</sup> image theories on China factors are dominant.

2<sup>nd</sup> image theories could be more meaningful in the matter of possibility.

**2<sup>nd</sup> image theories other than democratic peace theory needed – sovereignty and nationalism**

Combination of normative and explanatory theories

Quest for full sovereignty of three Northeast Asian countries and consequent regional instability

1. China's 'One China' principle
2. Japan's constitutional amendment
3. Korea's reunification

### **Consideration of complex 2<sup>nd</sup> images for peaceful transition**

Concept of 'creative deviation'

B. Badie, *The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order*

1. One China, diversified sovereignty? cf) J. Paltiel, *The Empire's New Clothes: Cultural Particularism and Universal Values in China's Quest for Global Status*
2. Conditions for Japan as a 'normal' country
3. Peace system of the Korean peninsula

How to relate idea (nationalism) and institution (sovereignty) in order to acquire flexibility?

Korea's power disparity and the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula are constant variables.

What kinds of agreeable complex models (both local and regional levels) can Korea suggest to China and Japan?

# Theory of International Relations in East Asia and Complexity

Byoung Won Min (Ewha Womans University)

## Motivations for Indigenous Theories

1. IR scholars in Korea have looked for a *Korean-style* theory of IR... upon the recognition that the country has relied too much on American IR.
2. No substantial progress in developing an indigenous theory yet, why?
3. Any East Asian-version of IR theory is necessary? Is it available soon?

## Points before Discussion

1. What is *theory*? Why do we have to think about the scope of a theory? Is the IR theory problematic if it is cross-applied to other regions and contexts? ... A *meta-theory*
2. Regionally relevant theory? A suggestion for different levels of theory applicability
  - A. Global level: Waltz, Keohane and Nye, Wendt... are they still Western?
  - B. Regional level: What features would we develop? East Asia?
  - C. Micro-level: Domestic society and personal features
3. Ontology (with difference) vs. epistemology (without difference)
4. Cases of regionally relevant theories: Latin America, Communist IR, Africa?

## Arguments for a More Systemic Theory

1. We need a *grand theory* first before talking about regionally relevant theories
2. Ontological bases are multiple: state, region, earth... a system of systems
3. System theory: system, boundary, environment, elements, interactions... GST
4. IR on the system of earth, region, state etc. ... How do you define a system? East Asia as a system?
5. Complex systems theory applied
  - A. System and *difference*... East Asia as a system with distinguished features

- B. External limits... Living environments of the Earth composed both of human beings and *non-human* materials ... A complex system of *self-organization* and *emergence*
  - C. Non-linear, probabilistic worldview ... Beyond deterministic one (Not rational choice)
  - D. More focus on the *relationship* between actors than on their attributes ... networks
  - E. Beyond positivist approach ... The problem of methodology
6. What should be done from now on?
- A. Indigenous theories start from a *comprehensive* framework (a *systems* theory) ... Let's share the framework and meta-theories.
  - B. Extract the *distinguished* features (differences) of the region or society that are to be contrasted to the existing theories.
  - C. Do not try any *definitive* but plausible explanations or predictions... *Patterns* are important.

# The Matter of Hermeneutics in International Politics

Jong Yoon DOH

(Research Fellow, Center for International Studies, SNU)

- **Given IR theory from American Scholars**

1. Scientific approach from Karl Popper/Imre Lakatos
2. Positivism
3. Relations-centric between independent variables and dependent variables
  - ➔ Causality-centric
  - ➔ Explanatory power
4. American IR theory: (Neo) Realism/New Liberalism
  - ➔ Conservative approach based on ensuring given hierarchic international order.
  - ➔ Ignoring internal capability of subject
  - ➔ IR mainstream cannot any more provide an implication of changed world politics since the end of the Cold War. (In particular, Neorealism)

- **Critical Approach**

1. Ontology

What is making International Politics?



➔ Need to restore 'Subject' into International Politics<sup>1</sup>

(Subject rather than unit)

➔ Autonomous Subject : Holding Soul(Plato) / Self-Instituted (Nietzsche)/  
Reflecting Subject (Descartes) / Responsibility(Levinas) / Indivisibility between  
subject-object (Heidegger)<sup>2</sup>

## 2. Epistemology

How do we know what know about IR?

➔ How to understand 'Subject' of IR

➔ Subject is understood through experience in the context of history and culture

➔ Phenomenology of *Dasein* (including IR) is absolutely to be  
hermeneutics.(Heidegger)<sup>3</sup>

➔ The way of understanding subject in IR is through interpreting their languages<sup>4</sup>  
(voice and text).

### ● Voice and Text

#### 1. Voice:

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<sup>1</sup> On differences between 'Self' and 'Subject', see, Julia Kristeva *La révolution du langage poétique* (1974)

<sup>2</sup> Because Dasein is being-in-the-world. Subject is object. Therefore they are not fixed in the historic situations.

<sup>3</sup> *Sein und Zeit* translated to Korean (2012)

<sup>4</sup> Not analyzing 'subject' but understanding it.

2. Text: All of international politics is in text.

- **For International Politics**

1. Intellectual society has to understand subject but not analyze.
2. Understanding subject from text.
3. The first step for text is to approach metonym.

- **Metonym<sup>5</sup> in International Politics** (ex. Documents)

- **International Politics in a better Understanding: Towards Insight**

➔ Rather 'Politology' than Political Science

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<sup>5</sup> A kind of figure of speech in which a thing or concept is called not by its own name but rather by the name of something associated in meaning with that thing or concept.(Merriam-webster)

## A Study on the period of power shift:

Sino-Japanese relations, 2004-2010

Lee, Bomi

Seoul National University

### Introduction

The focus of the world today is on Asia. The Obama administration has promoted a “Pivot to Asia” toward the Asia-Pacific. The main factor driving its diplomatic policy is the growing power of the Peoples’ Republic of China. China has long pursued a comprehensive foreign policy for maintaining a peaceful and stable regional environment in which China can achieve its goal of economic development. Despite China’s efforts, however, it has failed to dispel any concerns of a “China threat.”

While paying attention to China’s rapid growth, there is debate when China will surpass the U.S. in power, and whether this power shift will lead to war or not. According to power transition theory, power parity is the necessary condition for

major war. To be specific, when parity is present, the parties involved can choose to confront one another. For these reasons, power shift between a challenger and the dominant state raises concerns.


However, Power transitions between the strongest states are rare phenomena, while the shifts occur in a region can be observed more. Recently, there is a logical extension that the relationship between parity and war is applicable to regional system as well as to the overall system. In this regards, this paper attempts to examine the relations between China and Japan in the period of power shift.

## **Power shift in East Asia**

Power is a complex concept in international relations. It is often said that the result of the sum of different components such as military, economic capabilities is one's power. However, its definitions have been vague. Furthermore, different methods to calculate one's power as well as various of factors to consider make it difficult to measure precisely. Because of different calculations, the period of power shift is debatable.


In this paper, Gross Domestic Product(GDP) figures and military expenditure figures are considered. In 2010, China surpassed Japan in GDP. Since the late 1990s, China threat became controversial in Japan because of its rapid economic growth in terms of GDP. As the threat perception in Japan increased, Zheng Bijian claimed that Chinese huge population should be considered. He said that China remained a low-

income developing country in GDP per capita term. Despite his argument, GDP is generally considered as a power component and it is widely accepted that China has been the world's second largest economy since 2010.



In military expenditures, it is difficult to assess their shift point. Both of Government have published defense white paper, and announced their expenditures to the public. However, Japanese Government has pointed out China's transparency. Japanese annual white paper, *Defense of Japan* stated that the amount of its defense budget announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. At the same time, Japanese Defense Ministry estimated Chinese military capability based on the trend in the defense budget. According to its

calculation, if China is to continue increasing its defense spending at a rate of approximately 15% over the previous year in the future, the Chinese official defense expenditures will significantly exceed the defense budget of Japan by 2008. Meanwhile, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI)'s databas, Chinese military expenditures exceeded that of Japan in 2004.



As these factors considered, power shift between China and Japan occurred from 2004 to 2010. This paper focuses on this period to examine the dynamics between two states on the condition of power parity.

## **Period of power shift: Dynamics in the East China Sea**

It is claimed that states pursue power. On the other hand, it is also contended that states raise their power pursuing their own security. Still what the states ultimately pursue is debatable. Because of not knowing their intention, the tension occurs when a state's military capabilities rise. Over the few years, both China and Japan have taken an effort to strengthen their naval and air forces. At the same time, the dispute between two countries has come to the fore. Some claimed that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in the East China Sea will be the flashpoint to ignite a third Sino-Japanese War.

### **The Escalation of Tension: 2004-2005**


From 2004 to 2005, sensitive maritime incidents occurred between China and Japan. At first, seven Chinese activists landed on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in March. The Japanese Government arrested them and lodged an official protest with China. In return, the Chinese Government condemned the arrest of the activists.

In November 2004, an Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft confirmed that an unidentified submarine was navigating under water near the Sakishima Islands, which lie about 120km south of the disputed the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. After making a consideration over the information, the Japanese Government confirmed that the submarine belonged to the Chinese Navy. The Foreign Minister

Machimura made a protest to Chinese Minister to Japan Cheng Yong Hua. At first, The Chinese foreign ministry said it did not know the vessel's nationality. The Chinese later admitted that the submarine was theirs and expressed regret over the incident, declaring that the accidental incursion was due to technical reasons.

In 2005, Japanese Government authorized the Teitoku Sikiyu company to drill in a disputed area of the East China Sea for the purpose of extracting natural resources. The Chinese officially protested, stating that Japan's actions constitute a severe provocation to the interests of China. In response to the Japanese exploratory drilling, five Chinese naval vessels, including a guided-missile destroyer, were spotted near the Shirakaba/Chunxiao gas field in September 2005. China also increased, in 2005, the number of military surveillance flights into the disputed airspace. As the tension escalated, the immediate takeoff(the scramble) of Air Self-Defense Force increased in response to Chinese aircraft.





Based on these incidents, the Japanese Government complemented its security policy. Japanese Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) on December, 2004. NDPGs serve to provide basic guidelines for how Japan's defense should be tailored to achieve its end. According to NDPGs revised in 2004, there are two objectives for Japan's security: to prevent any threats from reaching Japan or repel them; and to improve international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan. And it placed emphasis on effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies. Compared to former NDPGs, Japanese Government focused on China's military capabilities and its maritime activities.

In recent years, we have witnessed vigorous maritime activities by Chinese naval vessels and

ocean-graphic research ships navigating in waters near Japan. One of the most notable cases has been the incident caused by a submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine that intruded into Japan's territorial waters last November. The Chinese navy aims to extend the space for offshore defensive operations while integrated combat capabilities are enhanced in conducting offshore campaigns, as mentioned above. In addition, it is pointed out that the country aims to build a so-called blue-water navy in the future. Therefore, it is important to monitor Chinese movements and identify Chinese strategies underlying them.

When the Japanese Government revised its security policy, they considered the incidents occurred between Japan and China. For example, it presented the response to submarines submerging in territorial waters. In addition, it stated that when the Chinese submarine was found in 2004, it took a considerable amount of time for the government to issue an order for maritime security operations. Because of this incident, the Japanese Government had newly set out the response plan.

### **The De-escalation of Tension: 2006–2009**

Since late 2006, Sino-Japanese relations have improved, starting with the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in early October. The tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute has been de-escalated, coinciding with an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. From 2006 to 2009, Japan-China Defense Talks held on various levels. After the visit of Japanese Prime Minister, Japanese and Chinese defense officials held working-level talks on November, 2006. In August 2007, there

was Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting. At this meeting, the ministers agreed to set up a joint working group to study the establishment of a communication mechanism between the two defense authorities to prevent the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances.

In November 2007, Chinese guided missile destroyer Shenzhen visited to the port of Tokyo. The visit of Chinese warship symbolized improving ties between the two states. In the following year, a Japanese destroyer, the Sazanami, docked at the southern Chinese port for the first time since the Second World War. This mutual visits were determined at Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 2007 and showed a diffusion of tensions between two countries.

The reduction in tension was visible in the relatively muted response from China to a naval exercise, jointly conducted by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the US Navy in late December 2006. This exercise simulated a hypothetical invasion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands which was considered as a contingency due to the Chinese landing in 2004.

As improving the ties, China and Japan made an agreement on the Joint development of gas deposits in the East China Sea in June 2008. In February 2009, Japan's Maritime Safety Agency stationed for the first time patrol vessels large with helicopter in the waters of Diaoyu Islands. Therefore, China's Foreign Ministry formally protested that any action by the Japanese side to strengthen actual control over the islands constitutes an infringement upon China's territorial sovereignty, which is illegal and invalid, and should be stopped immediately. About two weeks

later, China-Japan Foreign Ministerial Meeting was held, and the Foreign Ministers agreed to make an efforts not to worsen the ties between two states due to the dispute. In this regard, the tensions between China and Japan was managed in this period.

### **The Return of Tension : 2010-present**

In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat was spotted in Japan's EEZ near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by two Japanese Coast Guard vessels. The Japanese arrested the captain and crew of the fishing boat. After China's protest to the ambassador of Japan to China, the fishing boat crew was released. However, the fishing boat and the captain were held in custody by Japan. China was perturbed by this action, and requested that the ship and the captain be released. When Japan refused to release the captain and the boat, China embarked upon a trade embargo program in which Rare Earth Elements were no longer exported to Japan. As a result, Japan blinked and released the fishing boat captain.

In the following month, the Prime Ministers of two countries agreed to pursue an advance in their bilateral relations. Despite of this agreement, China opposed the Foreign Ministerial Meeting for a resolution of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute among China, Japan, and U.S. in November. At the following Meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the Chinese Premier, they showed a big difference in the way each perceived the territorial dispute.

As the tension escalated, the scramble actions of Air Self-Defense Force increased in response to Chinese aircraft rapidly. According to *Defense of Japan* revised in 2010, it placed emphasis on bilateral communication between Japan and China. On the disputed territory, however, it is still hard to find the resolution.

## Conclusion

This paper attempts to examine the relations between China and Japan in the period of power shift. As described above, there is a potential for the disputed territory, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to become a flashpoint of war. Although sensitive incidents occurred, both the countries tended to manage the tension by the year 2010. As China's military capabilities strengthened, Japan focused on it and made an effort to strengthen its naval and air forces. In this respect, Japan approved the revision of NDPGs in 2004. However, from 2006 to 2009, defense officials' meetings held regularly and they exchanged their opinion on the disputed territory. As a result, the tension de-escalated coinciding with an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. As these facts considered, both Government chose not to confront each other in the period of power shift.

Recently China's assertive posture on the maritime and airspace issue made deepen its neighbor's concerns. Although China surpassed Japan in the area of GDP and military expenditures, Japan still maintained its power and influence. In this regard, the relations between China and Japan should be focused on in this region

continuously. Further on, it is worth to do research on the dynamics after the power shift.

## **Status and development process of Chinese IR theory since 1990`s**

Kim Ji-young (Ewha Womans University)

China was trying to build its own style of IR theory. But still, it is below the level of existing IR theory, in the some part of discussion, it is received in 'particularity' rather than 'generality". Ultimately, it remains a question that "Will we be able to where to be located in the 'generality' and 'particularity 'Chinese IR theory".

Insist only the particularity of IR theory, then which part of the existing IR theory and make contact, and how one has established itself as a discipline can do. For example 阎学通, Chinese scholar, add Chinese political ideas to western realism theory and he looking at the world politics. In addition, there are some studies for through the 华夷思想 and 朝贡 (Chinese tributary system) of China, to understand the international relations of China.

Such a background, when we look at the position and role of international relations theory itself of China, it is possible to infer a close relationship policy of the party and foreign policy and international relations theory in China. I think in spite of it, in Korea, when we study the politics of China, and so far have focused on research related to foreign policy and the policy of the Chinese government. I think the contrary, as a basis of foreign policy of China, interested in the study of international relations itself theory in China and was not enough. So, my research question is that, "what's the problem of Chine's IR from 1990s". International relations theory of China began to develop remarkably after 1990s, I want to find out that the development process and current issue in this area.

From 1949 the establishment of the People's Republic of China to the '78 改革开放, the theory of international relations in china that have been studied Marx · Leninism, Maoism, primarily. In this period, Chinese IR mainly focused on the communism theory than the liberalism or realism theory. At the same time, "Chinese IR Theory", was used as the basic concept of foreign policy and the policy for the country and the Communists party. As a result, they could reveal diversification of theoretical research from the mid-1980s have been made.

From 1990, IR theory was introduced to China. International relations theory in China has grown rapidly in the last decade. Above all, mid-1980s diversification of Chinese IR theory leaded Chinese scholars. Then 1990s transformation of institution emerged with the University education system. However Chinese officials still stance opposition then the entire advocate. First, mainstream of America IR theory has been actively carried out, second, research theme of International Relations also, war strategy international law national sovereignty, environment, and foreign policy, human rights, and international organizations, international politics and civilization, and democracy was that in such problems, the range is widened. Third, a major publisher of China began to product the major international relations book. They published a translation of this major theoretical statement such as Kohein Robert, Joseph Nye, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Alexander Wendt. In terms of content, in international relations academic community in China there is a change.

According to table1, between 1978 and 1990, ratio of non-American study IR theory and American IR theory was 45:54, from1991 to 2000 was 69:31, and from 2001 to 2007 was 75:25. Since 1990, American international relations theory became highly concern in China.

**<table1. Ratio of non-American study IR theory and American IR theory >**

	<b>American IR theory</b>	<b>Non-American IR theory</b>
<b>1978~1990</b>	45	54
<b>1991-2000</b>	69	31
<b>2001~2007</b>	75	25

( 来源: 王逸舟主编,2008,『中国对外关系转型 30 年 1978-2008』,社会科学文献出版社 )



The emerging research of Realism, liberalism, constructivism is developed fluently by scholars. Among them, the study of liberalism theory has grown rapidly. From 1978 to 1990, 32 percent Marxism, liberalism accounted for 16%. Between 1991 and 2000, Marxism was 5% liberalism accounted for 37%, from 2001 to 2007, Marxism was 4 %, Liberalism was 32 percent. We can see the rapidly increasing of Constructivism. that's a 19% increasing on last 10years.

Since 1990, Interest of IR relations was growing with the development of the study international relations of China. For example 北京大学, 清华大学, 人民大学, 复旦大学 which could be the core research institute and the government agencies was to (College) School. These changes reveal that the department of interest in IR and expand of the scope of the study.

<table2. 中国主要大学的 国际关系学科 历史沿革>

大学	历史沿革
人民大学	<p>1950 年外交系和马列主义基础教研室。</p> <p>1955 年外交系的主体调出组建外交学院。</p> <p>1956 年马列主义基础教研室与学校其他机构一起组建历史系。</p> <p>1958 年独立组建马列主义基础系。</p> <p>1960 年组建政治学系。</p> <p>1964 年根据周恩来总理的指示和中共中央《关于加强国际问题研究的决定》，由教育部批准组建国际政治系。</p> <p><b>2000 年春</b>，学校进行学科整合和院系调整，在原国际政治系和俄罗斯东欧中亚所的基础上组建<b>国际关系学院</b>。</p>
北京大学	<p>1960 年，北京大学建立政治学系（1963 年改名为国际政治学系）国际关系学院即由此发展而来。</p> <p><b>1996—1998 年</b>，原北京大学国际政治学系、国际关系研究所和亚非研究所经合并调整，正式成立<b>北京大学国际关系学院</b>。</p>

清华大学	<p>1997 年， 成立的国际问题研究所的基础上建立的。</p> <p>2003 年， 增设国际关系硕士点和博士点， 以及社会科学实验班国际政治专业。</p> <p>2007 年， 成立清华大学国际关系学系/国际问题研究所（简称国关系）</p>
复旦大学	<p>1923 年,我校建立的政治学系。</p> <p>1964 年,成立的国际政治系。</p> <p>1980 年首先增设了政治学专业。</p> <p>1984 年设思想政治教育专业， 继后于 1988 年又增设行政管理专业。</p> <p>2000 年 11 月 21 日成立复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院。</p>

According to 王缉思 theory is ‘thought and principle to evoke action and ideology’. Studying social sciences in China related in 改革实践, 社会主义建设实践。There are also various Chinese value and norms. 王缉思 says that China has been emphasized the correlations of theory and policy. 毛泽东 also say that "no revolution theory, no revolution". After all the general picture of Chinese IR theory is practical theory.

As a leading state, China aim to construction of IR theory that could be satisfied their roles and responsibilities. But at the same time it brings about controversial of ‘generality’ and ‘particularity’ of IR theory. Chinese IR stands on a ‘generality’ and ‘particularity’ in this

issue. Some part of Chinese scholar insist that emphasizing 中国特色(的国际关系理论) arrest the development of Chinese IR. In other words, It must be equipped 'systemically' and 'logicality' than 'particularity(中国特色)' for the progress of Chinese IR.

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# ASIA PACIFIC AS A REGION: STUDY OF 'REGIONNESS' CHARACTERIZED BY DOUBLE IDENTITY

SNU-Beijing University Exchange Seminar 2014

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*\* This is a summary of the original paper and does not contain proper references. Please refer to the original copy for sources.*

## 1. Introduction

In a study of regionalism informed by traditional billiard ball model of the sovereign nation state, region and regional institution are not considered to be the center of the issue but rather elements created out of power and interests. However, taking into consideration the 'sociological turn' of international relations recently pioneered by proponents of constructivism, an analysis of regionalism must also call into question how a concept of region is socially constructed. It is the argument of this study that 'regionness,' thinly defined as characteristics that render a geographic area a "region," of the Asia Pacific is particularly of interest in study of IR, as it can add ideational analyses on to the existing explanations based on neorealism and neoliberalism.

## 2. Asia Pacific: Region-building as a 'Project'

The starting point of this study is the trait of Asia Pacific as a 'Project.' It is clearly a region that has been actively imagined and constructed by actors and a number of observations can be made based on a study of literature by Yahuda, Dirlik, and Funabashi. First, Asia Pacific was created within the geopolitical context of end of the Cold War. Second, Asia Pacific was mainly created by the United States, Japan, and Australia, whose efforts came to fruit as APEC and ARF were eventually institutionalized.

## 3. Study of 'Regionness': Institutionalization, Region-building, and emerging 'Regionness'

### 1) Statements before Institutionalization

A few observations can be made from an analysis of official documents, politicians' speeches, and critics' statements(Refer to Original copy for references). First, the change in international political environment is emphasized, while the increased international trade

between countries is most often highlighted. Second, elements of security and threat are both present in security aspect. While Baker argues the need for a security arrangement based on perceived threats within the region, Department of State Briefing identified relative stability of the region as a reason why security mechanism is going to be successful. Third, as clearly seen from the media briefing, an explicit reference to the 'project' nature of the regional order concept is made. Fourth, US-Japan alliance plays a central role in the specific regional order conceptualized. Also important to highlight is the repeated reference to democratization and its ideals as basis for community-building.

## 2) Institutionalization and Region-building

To show the process of institutionalization, Funabashi's study is instructive, as his is one that is based on interviews of officials and diplomats on how APEC developed over the first few years after its inception.

Moreover, an important factor that motivated creation and further institutionalization of APEC was regionalism in Europe. The US and Asia Pacific countries wanted to compete against European regionalism by forming one on their own. Their efforts were partly rewarding when European countries gave up on their bold demands in GATT negotiations because of an alternative. Asia Pacific countries thus can be said to move onto the road for regionalism partly motivated by viewing Europe as the important other which required a collective identity on their own.

## 3) 'Regionness' of Asia Pacific

Based on an analysis of characterizations of Asia Pacific put forward by practitioners and academics, I attempt to draw a number of observations. First, a point worth repeating is that Asia Pacific region displays a 'project' character, one that is not only clearly purposively created but also normatively argued. Asia Pacific 'ought to be' a region, as perceived and argued by more than a handful as seen from the analysis of this paper. It needs to be reminded here that the created concept of Asia Pacific is remarkably successful today, as demonstrated before. As such, we can theorize that the birth of a region concept is a prerequisite for acceptance from the perspective of a state that it is placed under a context in which same set of norms apply. This point is related to the concepts of "international system" and "international society" theorized by the English School of International Relations. One could argue that study of international order can be informed by the dynamics of region-building, especially at the stage of a birth of a region, in which the state accepts its placement under a constructed regional project. Second, we find that security and economics still play a central role in demarcating the regional idea. As noted, arguments for security order in Asia Pacific utilized both threat and stability for its regional idea.



Third, ideational factors such as values and political ideals were consistently presented at the level of pre-institutionalization. These universalist positions were mixed with Asian identities to create an Asia Pacific regional identity salad bowl in which supposedly contradicting identities co-exist. Universalist and relativist arguments analyzed before in this paper must be viewed as part of the mixed salad bowl. In this context, a possibly promising visualization of the salad bowl is to imagine Asia Pacific region as one this mainly organized around US-Japan linkage in terms of its security and economic arrangements and one that revolves around a West-Asia value and identity spectrum. This picture allows a tentative way to view Asia Pacific as a region with certain characteristic of regionness. Then we can throw in perspectives of “two-way osmosis,” a possible “fusion,” or “contradictions about concept of community.”

#### 4. Conclusions and Implications

Asia Pacific displays a ‘thin’ or ‘faint’ case of regionalism. This paper examined the characteristics of what allows Asia Pacific to exist as a region as a pilot concept ‘regionness.’ Paying attention to the political statements made by the United States, this paper examined the first character of Asia Pacific, which as a ‘project’ character. Analysis of the process of institutionalization confirmed this diagnosis, and the security- and economics-driven nature of this regional creation. Also noted was the point that Asia Pacific was imagined and institutionalized with much attention to the European regionalism as the other. Lastly turning to how Asia Pacific was viewed as a single unit of regional analysis, this paper has argued that Asia Pacific displayed a double and possibly contradictory regional identity which also characterizes its ‘regionness.’

Conceptualization of a created region with a double identity that survives as a ‘faint’ region idea is possibly an analytical resource in trying to understand a world driven by multiple regionalisms and multilateralisms that overlap each other. As Hu argues, ‘thin but large’ regional frameworks such as APEC or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) could link and provide balance in institutional architecture. A study of region that pays attention to the dynamic process of region idea creation, institutionalization, and region-building, that is also mindful of power, interest, and idea is perhaps one that is much called for in explaining contemporary international relations.

**Asia Pacific as a Region:**  
**Study of 'Regionness' Characterized by Double**  
**Identity**

SNU-Beijing University Exchange Seminar 2014

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### 1. Introduction

What is a region in the study of international relations? What provokes academic interest in region in international relations may be said to be the attempt to explain a regionalization as a process that revolves around the project of regionalism. However, in a traditional billiard ball model of the sovereign nation state, region and regional institution are not considered to be the center of the issue but rather elements created out of power and interests. An analysis that is informed by recent developments of the European Union (EU) as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the other hand, pays attention to the dynamics of regionalism and regionalization. Moreover, taking into consideration the 'sociological turn' of international relations recently pioneered by proponents of

constructivism, an analysis of regionalism must also call into question how a concept of region is socially constructed.

Perhaps a study fully informed by main theories of international relations should pay attention to dynamics of power, interest, and ideas, taking into account the possibility that each case in question may contain different levels of each element.<sup>6</sup> In this context, the region of Asia Pacific is indeed an interesting case of regionalism, based on a number of reasons.

First of all, unlike the EU or ASEAN which are typically the topics of research of successful regionalism, Asia Pacific lacks the level of institutionalization and is a rather a 'faint' region.

Second, based on the 'faint' characteristic, many studies on the Asia Pacific are focused on neorealist or neoliberal strands of analyses.<sup>7</sup> Third, the most important point of interest is its 'constructed' characteristic, which is to say that, unlike other regional concepts that develop naturally over a long period of time, Asia Pacific as a region has been intentionally created. As will be considered and argued in the following sections, Asia Pacific was a 'project' of regional diplomacy. Ironically, however, such a 'new' region-building project has a much bigger room of maneuver when it comes to strategic choices in how to 'construct' a region, precisely because of its lack of common historical experience. Asia Pacific region can be conceptualized in a multiple way, free from historical path dependency.

Fourth, there is an element of contradiction within the concept of the Asia Pacific. Both 'Western identity' and 'Asian identity' exist within what comes to be imagined as the Asia Pacific. This contradictory nature is different from mere existence of diverse set of identities within a region, such as the case of Asia itself which contains multiple cultures and religions. How can Asia Pacific exist as a single concept of regional identity when identities within it are seen as contradictory?

Fifth, despite all above factors, Asia Pacific as a region is still commonly used as a unit of analysis and research. It has regional institutions around the same parameters such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which began as a ministerial level meeting in 1989 and became further institutionalized as time went on. Moreover, a number of actors within the region continue to use Asia Pacific as units of policy and analysis.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Cox, Robert. "Social Forces, States and World Orders." *Neorealism and its Critics* (1986). pp. 126-155.

<sup>7</sup> Studies that pay attention to social construction of the region include those by Acharya, Dirlik, and Tan, whose research will be considered in the following section.

<sup>8</sup> The United States Department of State continues to have Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

Now I would like to lay out the main points and structure of this paper. The starting point of this study is the trait of Asia Pacific as a 'Project.' It is clearly a region that has been actively imagined and constructed by actors and a study of such construct entails the following.

First, we must consider at what point in time the region-building of Asia Pacific is taking place. This requires a process of taking a look at the region-building attempts in history of Asia Pacific. At this step, this paper briefly considers a number of projects that aim to enhance interactions between countries in the Asia Pacific and argues that the construction of region mainly took place in the context of the end of the Cold War. Part two of this paper will contain this argument.

Second, if region-building is a process of turning a 'non-region' into a region by the statements of international actors, it is closely related to institutionalization of a body that demarcates the same geographic parameters. As an institution emerges and takes on a consistent and material form, the region follows its development. One could argue that institutionalization is a variable that strengthens region-building, which in turn would feed-back into institutionalization to allow more momentum. In this context, 'regionness' is defined broadly to mean the conceptualized product of the region through statement of actors such as government officials, academics, and critics. It is the aim of this study to find out 'regionness' of Asia Pacific, which I argue is a potential barometer that explains the success and failure of the region idea. This will be section three of this paper.

Lastly, section four of paper will ask the potential implications of the concept of 'regionness' of the Asia Pacific.

## 2. Asia Pacific: Region-building as a 'Project'

### 1) The End of Cold War and Asia Pacific Regionalism

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while Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses "Asia Pacific" and Korea's Ministry uses "South Asia and Pacific" as its official regional demarcation. Furthermore, a handful of major media companies such as the *New York Times*, *Joongang Daily*, and *Hankyoreh* use "Asia Pacific" as unit of regional reporting, while *BBC* uses "East Asia/Pacific" under its "Asia" section.

Looking for the proper point of time that Asia Pacific became a region is not just a historical study, but also a theoretical one. It is potentially related to a theoretical point that considers whether a region arises from material, institution, or idea. However, in this paper I have a modest aim, which is to simply consider which point of time is important in considering when Asia Pacific became a region.

Yahuda argues in a textbook intended for students of international politics of Asia Pacific that the region was created for geopolitical and geo-economic reasons, rather than being created over time naturally. Pointing to Washington Conference of 1921-22 to as the first point in history in which Asia Pacific was considered as an independent region, he makes reference to a number of other points after World War II. However, the important point was the end of the Cold War, in whose context countries sought to manage the rise of China through multilateral cooperation such as APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).<sup>9</sup>

Dirlik similarly points to the fact that Asia Pacific was intentionally created by “EuroAmerican” influences in the context of power politics between states, rather than arising naturally. He argues that Asia Pacific idea was first thought up by Japan, which was eventually taken up by United States, and later joined by Australia. According to him, the first fruit of the idea of the region was the 1991 Seoul APEC Conference.<sup>10</sup>

Acharya lists perhaps the most comprehensive list of economic cooperation projects in the Asia Pacific by Japan and Australia from 1960 to 1980 and argues that these initiatives entailed efforts to encourage participation from member states of ASEAN, whose norms were “diffused” eventually into Asia Pacific cooperation after the end of the Cold War.<sup>11</sup>

A number of observations can be made based on the above summary. First, Asia Pacific was created within the geopolitical context of end of the Cold War. Second, Asia Pacific was mainly created by the United States, Japan, and Australia, whose efforts came to fruit as APEC and ARF were eventually institutionalized.

### 3. Study of ‘Regionness’: Institutionalization, Region-building, and emerging ‘Regionness’

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<sup>9</sup> Michael Yahuda. *The International Politics of the Asia Pacific*. Taylor & Francis, 2011. pp. 5-9.

<sup>10</sup> Arif Dirlik, ed. *What is in a rim?: critical perspectives on the Pacific Region idea*. Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. pp. 7-9.

<sup>11</sup> Amitav Acharya, *Whose ideas matter?*. Cornell University Press, 2009. pp. 102-111.

As mentioned above, the aim of this paper is to examine 'regionness' of Asia Pacific from statements of actors and this entails a three step analysis. First of all, I would like to take a look at statements before the institutionalization of APEC and ARF. Then I consider the process of institutionalization of APEC briefly. At the last step, the statements that defined and characterized Asia Pacific are analyzed.

A note on method is due at this point. By statements, I mean those that characterize Asia Pacific as a region in a qualitative way in the international forum of discourse in major newspapers or journals from 1988 until 1997. Short of a comprehensive analysis, I consider only official government documents, speeches given by politicians, opinion pieces by the media, and journal pieces and try to find patterns, consistencies, and contradictions in their characterizations of Asia Pacific as a region. Such a method is to map the discussion and debate surrounding the region and thus must be sensitive political nature of statements being presented. It is informed by the fact that statements are politically purposive in their intention and social in their consequences.

However, such a method is subject to criticism, mainly an accusation of "essentialism." Tan argues that "essentialism" is first an assumption that the state exists ontologically *a priori* and has a given identity and secondly that "knowledge community" of security studies follows the identity of the state. According to Tan, to subscribe to such "essentialism" is to make a mockery of agency of epistemic community and thus falls short of a proper analysis of statements. He accuses most constructivist studies of Asia Pacific security of such shortcoming and proposes a research sensitive such agency of "knowledge community" of Asia Pacific security studies.<sup>12</sup>

Such a criticism can be valid, in that it may be important to look at the discussion and discourse of "knowledge communities," as they do not automatically accept the discourse as it is. However, while I accept that it may be an incomplete analysis to focus on official documents and policy journal pieces mainly written by practitioners, it is still meaningful to do so in the case of Asia Pacific, as it was created as a foreign policy project of certain states. This analysis does not take the epistemic community as lacking agency and Tan's argument can stimulate studies that take into view both scopes of discourse.

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<sup>12</sup> See Seng Tan, *The Role of Knowledge Communities in Constructing Asia-Pacific Security: How thought and talk make war and peace*. Edwin Mellen Press, 2007. pp. 38-39.

## 1) Statements before Institutionalization

Statements about the characteristic of Asia Pacific as a region arise out of the time-sensitive context and thus need to be analyzed in a manner careful with time. APEC Conference in Blake Island, Seattle in 1993 is an important timing for analysis as it denotes a point when APEC was established as a permanent institution with a Secretariat in Singapore. It was a point at which an Asia Pacific regional institution as first institutionalized.

With such a point in mind, statements before institutionalization are considered in a different light. Then the process of institutionalization requires a brief look. First of all, critics point to the global change of the context of international relations. For example, a paper that was presented as a classified report to the Ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1993 summarizes three factors that have changed in global international political arena. First factor is “crisis of global trade system,” which is partly due to protectionist policies of many nations (20 out of 24 OECD members at that time) after 1980s. Second is a trend of “inward-looking” regionalisms around the world such as one in Europe. Third, sources of conflict such as trade disputes were sprouting in Asia Pacific during this period<sup>13</sup> Moreover, in a newspaper column, the main force behind APEC Conference in Seattle is identified as the fact that the US now trades more with countries in Asia Pacific than Europe or Latin America<sup>14</sup> Lastly, another article identified three foundations on which an Asia Pacific community can be built: namely increase of trade between countries in the region, rising number of immigrants from Asia in the United States, and the formation of personal trans-national relations.<sup>15</sup> In summary, commentators all point to the rise of international trade within the region and argue that increased economic cooperation in the same regional demarcation is needed.

Second, statements argue for Asia Pacific regionalism as a ‘project’, based on rational calculation for national interest. Such discussions present a specific form of regional order optimal for the country in question and thus need to be analyzed more in detail. For example, a critic views that US-Japan security alliance as the central axis in Asia Pacific security order

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<sup>13</sup> Narongchai Akrasanee, et al. "Now Let's Build an Asia-Pacific Economy Community." *International Herald Tribune*: 4. Nov 04 1993. *ProQuest*. Web. 22 Dec. 2013 .

<sup>14</sup> “Asia, America, Europe”, *International Herald Tribune*, Nov 17, 1993

<sup>15</sup> James A. Baker, I.,II. "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community." *Foreign Affairs* 70.5 (1992): 1. *ProQuest*. Web. 22 Dec. 2013.



at that time and presents a prescriptive argument that the US must build a regional security body in Asia Pacific much like the one in Europe.<sup>16</sup>

For Lord, Assistant Secretary of State of the US at that time, there was a need to create a new Pacific community to maximize political and economic interests of the US. He also argued for a strengthened alliance with Japan, as well as increased economic cooperation in the Pacific region. He identified economic cooperation, regional security consultations, and spread of liberal democracy as important blueprint of Asia Pacific community. Taking into account the difference between Europe and Asia Pacific, however, he argued for an informal and bilateral way of cooperation, rather than formal institutions.<sup>17</sup>

Baker, Secretary of State of the US at that time, maintained that Asia Pacific community must be built based on three foundations: economic cooperation, sharing of values and a sense of community through democratization, and a security order that can manage distrust and fear within the region. His conceptualization of Asia Pacific regional order is much like a hub-and-spokes structure, whose main axis are US-Japan, US-Korea, US-ASEAN, and US-Australia alliances and relations. He identifies APEC as the central focus of institutional ground to build a pacific community and argues that APECs working groups will be instrumental in building a sense of community and overcoming the instability of post-Cold War order.

He identifies three main common threats of the pacific community, which are North Korea's aspirations towards acquiring a nuclear weapon, its repeated non-compliance with Nonproliferation Treaty, and the threat of nuclear proliferation, the last one being the most important one.<sup>18</sup> If the above statements were presented in a public forum of discussion in a policy-prescriptive fashion, we find a slightly different version of regional order conceptualized in official speeches and documents of the US.

President Clinton's speech in Japan in 1993 presents the idea of "New Pacific community" as the regional order to be created and also identifies US-Japan alliance as the main foundation. Also highlighted as important elements of the community are economic liberalization and democratic reforms in countries within the region.<sup>19</sup> During a speech given

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<sup>16</sup> Tommy T.B Koh, "Asia Needs U.S.-Japanese Cooperation", *International Herald Tribune*, Dec 17, 1991.

<sup>17</sup> Winston Lord, "It Is Time for America to Help Build a New Pacific Community", *International Herald Tribune*, April 9, 1993

<sup>18</sup> Baker, 1992.

<sup>19</sup> William J. Clinton: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at Waseda University in Tokyo," July 7, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

before the National Assembly in Korea just a few days after, he lays out four priorities in the community's security arrangement: US military commitments, strengthened efforts to prevent proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional consensus against common security challenges, and support for democracies and open societies.<sup>20</sup>

There are some interesting elements in a US Department of State media briefing after the two speeches by Clinton. Three factors highlighted as importance of Asia Pacific for the US were relative stability of the region in terms of security, expected economic gains, and US diplomatic activities in 1993 based on these two factors. The blueprint for the Pacific community envisages an Asia Pacific-wide cooperation in economic aspect. An interesting point here is that a direct and honest comment is made that the US is "going to stay on in Asia in [its] own self-interest, not just as a favor to others." Moreover, unlike a security arrangement of states against an external threat, the envisaged community is one whose purpose is "preventive diplomacy" between states who clearly have possible sources of conflict. Its specific considerations will be non-proliferation and regulations for WMDs. In addition to economic and security aspect, the importance of democratization as well as rule of law, freedom of press, and freedom of debate is highlighted is an important prerequisite to an envisaged Pacific community. The briefing concludes by reiterating that the above economic, security, and value community idea was most of all an American strategy and that it was expected to realize it with the help of alliances and other states in the region.<sup>21</sup>

A few observations can be made from the above statements before the institutionalization process of regional bodies. First, the change in international political environment is emphasized, while the increased international trade between countries is most often highlighted. Second, elements of security and threat are both present in security aspect. While Baker argues the need for a security arrangement based on perceived threats within the region,<sup>22</sup> Department of State Briefing identified relative stability of the region as a reason why security mechanism is going to be successful.<sup>23</sup> Third, as clearly seen from the media briefing, an explicit reference to the 'project' nature of the regional order concept is made. Fourth, US-Japan alliance plays a central role in the specific regional order

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<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46813>.

<sup>20</sup> William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul," July 10, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.  
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46829>.

<sup>21</sup> "Vision for a New Pacific Community." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4.36 (1993): 612. *ProQuest*. Web. 22 Dec. 2013.

<sup>22</sup> Baker, 1992

<sup>23</sup> "Vision for a New Pacific Community." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4.36

conceptualized. Also important to highlight is the repeated reference to democratization and its ideals as basis for community-building.

## 2) Institutionalization and Region-building

Next step in analysis is to look at the process of institutionalization, namely of APEC the first Asia Pacific institution to emerge. APEC officially started off as a ministerial meeting of 12 countries in Canberra in 1989 for the first time. Membership increased to 15 in 1991, 17 in 1993, 18 in 1994, and 21 as of now. Countries participate as member economies in APEC.

A study of the international context in which APEC developed out of also highlights the active role of the US in creating the institution. The objectives of US in seeking such a regional framework included rise of and check against exclusive regionalism such as ASEAN and EU, 'nurturing' of Japan, and exercising hegemony in Asia.<sup>24</sup> While such a rational analysis has its strengths in capturing especially power and strategic dynamics of US motives behind APEC's creation, it does not go so far as to demonstrate how the US actually viewed, conceptualized, and in a way 'constructed' a region of Asia Pacific in its use of language. I will come back to this point when we consider the 'regionness.'

To show the process of institutionalization, Funabashi's study is instructive, as his is one that is based on interviews of officials and diplomats on how APEC developed over the first few years after its inception. According to him, the idea of Asia Pacific regionalism was first conceptualized by then-Prime Minister of Australia Bob Hawke and immediately kicked off by his aggressive diplomatic efforts. While Asia Pacific regional cooperation ideas existed in Japan in 1987 and in US in 1988, Hawke's idea was the one that gained momentum and three most active proponents, namely Japan, Australia, and the US.<sup>25</sup>

The three countries took initiative in moving forward with the idea and ASEAN countries were carefully chosen as prospective members. The "three Chinas (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong)" were pushed down the list under consideration that it may be dangerous to include them because of size of Chinese economy as well as ambivalence towards rise of China. The

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<sup>24</sup> Youngson Ha, Injoon Kim, Kiwhan Kim, "Prospects and Challenges of Asia Pacific Region Cooperation System", *International Region Studies*, 5 /3, 1996, 1-51, Seoul National University Center of International Regions

<sup>25</sup> Yoichi Funabashi, *Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC*. Peterson Institute Press: All Books (1995). Pp. 43-88.

leadership of the three, however, was met with opposition by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who instead pursued an idea of East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). EAEC failed because of US opposition followed by Korea and Japan.<sup>26</sup> In the ministerial meeting in 1992 in Bangkok, a number of important decisions were made; one to create an Eminent Persons' Group (EPG) composed of scholars and diplomats to provide advice on future vision of APEC; while another was to create a Secretariat in Singapore.

Most important meeting was 1993 Seattle, where more than two times the reporters in Maastricht Summit in 1992 were present to report the historic creation of an Asia Pacific institution. The meeting was attended by 17 leaders of states who discussed the creation of an Asia Pacific community. The leaders' declaration emphasized that their ultimate aim was to create a free trade area in the region, which was an ambitious goal requiring not just economic cooperation but a robust sense of identity.<sup>27</sup>

An important factor that motivated creation and further institutionalization of APEC was regionalism in Europe. The US and Asia Pacific countries wanted to compete against European regionalism by forming one on their own. Their efforts were partly rewarding when European countries gave up on their bold demands in GATT negotiations because of an alternative. Asia Pacific countries thus can be said to move onto the road for regionalism partly motivated by viewing Europe as the important other which required a collective identity on their own.<sup>28</sup>

### 3) 'Regionness' of Asia Pacific

Based on above analysis of institutionalization, how was Asia Pacific as a region viewed by practitioners and academics? In this section I attempt to examine how Asia Pacific was viewed as a region and whether the regional concept was unitary in character. An anonymous contributor argues that conditions were "ripe for new world," mainly because of efforts by President Clinton to create a "New Pacific community." While expressing his

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<sup>26</sup> Funabashi, 1995, pp. 55-69

<sup>27</sup> 1993 Leaders' Declaration, Seattle Declaration - *APEC Leaders Economic Vision Statement*, [http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/1993/1993\\_aelm.aspx](http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/1993/1993_aelm.aspx) (Accessed Dec. 20th, 2013)

<sup>28</sup> Youngson Ha, Injoon Kim, Kiwhan Kim, 1996.

optimist outlook of the new order he argued that the Pacific community must move beyond mere economic cooperation to achieve a higher level of community.<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, there were more than a handful of critics who were negative or even cynical of the future of Asia Pacific for different reasons. Arguments were made that Asia Pacific community was more a myth than a reality and also that there were contradictory identities within the regional project. Morrison comments that current developments were “talk shops” that lacked concrete institutionalization and encouraged member states to strive more actively towards “community-building” process which, author adds, is an extraordinarily difficult process.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, Manning viewed the Asia Pacific community concept as a “myth” at a point where APEC was gaining momentum in its institutionalization. While Asia Pacific as a geographic area was extraordinarily large, it retained a remarkably “Asian identity” that was far from stable but was subject to potential conflicts between China and Japan.<sup>31</sup>

Similarly, Ping points to a fundamentally contradictory worldviews between the West and Asia whose most central difference was between the interests of the individual versus the collective.<sup>32</sup> Ogita resonates with this by pointing out that the source of conflict between views on prospects of APEC is a fundamentally different view of what a community is. While Asian concept of community is family-based and relational, that of the West is legal, purposive and based on social contract.<sup>33</sup> Mahhubani, while agreeing that the value system of the West and Asia are different, argues that it is important to learn from each other to allow a “two-street cultural osmosis.” A primary example of such learning is that of Japan, which integrated its own culture and that of the West to get ahead in Asia.<sup>34</sup> Funabashi argues that Asia Pacific regionalism mainly represented by APEC meant “fusion” of Asia and the West, and Japan was taking role of a bridge between the two in the process.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> "Asia, APEC, and the Pacific Community - A New World Dawns." *Business America* 115.11 (1994): 4. ProQuest. Web. 23 Dec. 2013.

<sup>30</sup> Charles E. Morrison, "There are Smarter Ways to Build an Asia-Pacific Community." *International Herald Tribune*: 10. Nov 13 1995. ProQuest. Web. 23 Dec. 2013 .

<sup>31</sup> Robert A. Manning, and Paula Stern, "The Myth of the Pacific Community." *Foreign Affairs* 73.6 (1994): 79. ProQuest. Web. 23 Dec. 2013.

<sup>32</sup> Ho Kwon Ping, "Pacific Asia's Rise Involves More Than Economics", *International Herald Tribune*, May 11, 1994

<sup>33</sup> Ogita, Tatsushi. *The Origins of Contrasting Views on APEC*. Vol. 96. No. 5. APEC Study Center, Institute of Developing Economies, 1997. pp. 27-32, 40-41.

<sup>34</sup> Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way," *Foreign Affairs* 74.1 (1995): 100. ProQuest. Web. 23 Dec. 2013.

<sup>35</sup> Funabashi, 1995, pp. 1-14.

While the views above are personal interpretations of what Asia Pacific means, Acharya's scholarly work on "the Asia Pacific Way" is worth mentioning. His argument is that the institutional processes of APEC displayed norms such as 'open regionalism', 'soft regionalism', and 'consensus' which were diffused from ASEAN.<sup>36</sup> The case of Asia Pacific regionalism, in his view, is one that displays ideational dynamics as much as power or interests.

Based on above statements, I attempt to draw a number of observations. First, a point worth repeating is that Asia Pacific region displays a 'project' character, one that is not only clearly purposively created but also normatively argued. Asia Pacific 'ought to be' a region, as perceived and argued by more than a handful as seen from the analysis of this paper. It needs to be reminded here that the created concept of Asia Pacific is remarkably successful today, as demonstrated before. As such, we can theorize that the birth of a region concept is a prerequisite for acceptance from the perspective of a state that it is placed under a context in which same set of norms apply. This point is related to the concepts of "international system" and "international society" theorized by the English School of International Relations.<sup>37</sup> One could argue that study of international order can be informed by the dynamics of region-building, especially at the stage of a birth of a region, in which the state accepts its placement under a constructed regional project. Moreover, a re-imagined concept of 'international society' as 'a group of states accepting the grouping idea of such that is supposedly under some level of regular interactions, norms, and identity' allow us to link the study of order with 'new' regions such as Asia Pacific. Such a 'thin' and 'faint' region idea can exist and even persist, while other region ideas such as East Asia gain more momentum.

Second, we find that security and economics still play a central role in demarcating the regional idea. As noted, arguments for security order in Asia Pacific utilized both threat and stability for its regional idea.

Third, ideational factors such as values and political ideals were consistently presented at the level of pre-institutionalization. These universalist positions were mixed with Asian identities to create an Asia Pacific regional identity salad bowl in which supposedly contradicting identities co-exist. Universalist and relativist arguments analyzed before in this paper must be viewed as part of the mixed salad bowl. In this context, a possibly promising

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<sup>36</sup> Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the 'ASEAN way' to the 'Asia-Pacific way'?" *The Pacific Review* 10.3 (1997): 319-346.

<sup>37</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*. (3rd ed.) Columbia University Press, 2002.

visualization of the salad bowl is to imagine Asia Pacific region idea as one that is mainly organized around US-Japan linkage in terms of its security and economic arrangements and one that revolves around a West-Asia value and identity spectrum. This picture allows a tentative way to view Asia Pacific as a region with certain characteristic of regionness. Then we can throw in perspectives of “two-way osmosis,” a possible “fusion,” or “contradictions about concept of community.”

#### 4. Conclusions and Implications

Asia Pacific displays a ‘thin’ or ‘faint’ case of regionalism. This paper examined the characteristics of what allows Asia Pacific to exist as a region as a pilot concept ‘regionness.’ Paying attention to the political statements made by the United States, this paper examined the first character of Asia Pacific, which as a ‘project’ character. Analysis of the process of institutionalization confirmed this diagnosis, and the security- and economics-driven nature of this regional creation. Also noted was the point that Asia Pacific was imagined and institutionalized with much attention to the European regionalism as the other. Lastly turning to how Asia Pacific was viewed as a single unit of regional analysis, this paper has argued that Asia Pacific displayed a double and possibly contradictory regional identity which also characterizes its ‘regionness.’

Conceptualization of a created region with a double identity that survives as a ‘faint’ region idea is possibly an analytical resource in trying to understand a world driven by multiple regionalisms and multilateralisms that overlap each other. As Hu argues, ‘thin but large’ regional frameworks such as APEC or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) could link and provide balance in institutional architecture.<sup>38</sup> A study of region that pays attention to the dynamic process of region idea creation, institutionalization, and region-building, that is also mindful of power, interest, and idea is perhaps one that is much called for in explaining contemporary international relations.

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<sup>38</sup> Hu Weixing. "Building Asia-Pacific Regional Institution: The Role of APEC," *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences* 77 (2013): 65-73.

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